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Businesses Must Pay When They Let 
Others Play: A Business Entity’s Duty 
to Prevent the Foreseeable Criminal 
Acts of Others 
Colleen Giles* 
INTRODUCTION 
In Rhode Island, the existence of a legal duty in a negligence 
action is a pure question of law.1  Therefore, establishing a duty in 
a negligence claim is essential to surviving pretrial dispositive 
motions.2  The linchpin in establishing a duty is foreseeability.3  In 
cases where a plaintiff, on a business’s premises, is injured by a 
third party’s criminal acts, the plaintiff can establish foreseeability 
by showing that similar criminal acts had occurred there before.  
Without prior similar criminal acts, it can be very difficult to 
 
 *  Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 
2019. 
 1. Volpe v. Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699, 705 (R.I. 2003). 
 2. See Phelps v. Hebert, 93 A.3d 942, 946 (R.I. 2014) (“If the court finds 
that no duty exists, ‘the trier of fact has nothing to consider and a motion for 
summary judgment must be granted.’”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Gushlaw v. Milner, 42 A.3d 1245, 1252 (R.I. 2012) (“It is not until a legal duty 
is established that a plaintiff is entitled to a factual determination on the 
enduring elements of his or her negligence claim . . . .”); Benaski v. 
Weinberg, 899 A.2d 499, 502 (R.I. 2006) (“A fundamental principle of tort law, 
and a dispositive one based on the circumstances of this case, is that ‘[a] 
defendant cannot be liable under a negligence theory unless the defendant 
owes a duty to the plaintiff.’” (quoting Lucier v. Impact Recreation, Ltd., 864 
A.2d 635, 638 (R.I. 2005))).  But see Kuzniar v. Keach, 709 A.2d 1050, 1055–56 
(R.I. 1998) (“[I]t is still the function of the jury to determine the existence of 
those predicate facts that trigger the presence of the legal duty.”).  
 3. Mu v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 882 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2018); Volpe, 
A.2d at 705. 
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establish foreseeability.  As a general rule, a landowner does not 
have a duty to control criminal acts of third parties.4  Consequently, 
plaintiffs alleging that a business has a duty to prevent criminal 
acts of third parties—without evidence of prior similar criminal 
acts—are often unable to prevail on pretrial dispositive motions and 
get their case before a jury.  In Mu v. Omni Hotels Management 
Corp., the First Circuit created a new avenue for plaintiffs to assert 
that a hotel has a duty to prevent foreseeable harm caused by the 
criminal acts of others.5 
As a matter of first impression under Rhode Island law, the 
First Circuit, in its “Erie guess,” held that a hotel had a legal duty 
to an invitee because the sequence of events leading to the invitee’s 
injury made the harm foreseeable.6  The “sequence of events” 
theory is a new method for plaintiffs to establish foreseeability in 
Rhode Island, thus triggering a business entity’s legal duty to 
prevent harm. 
Foreseeability is often the most difficult theory to prove in 
determining whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff.7  
Foreseeability is defined differently in each jurisdiction, but is 
typically an amalgam of: 
[T]he multitude of factors, knowledge, hunches, instincts 
or what they may be called, the common sense that makes 
social intercourse possible, all operate to prompt the 
“ordinary reasonable man” that harms are “probable” or 
“natural” as normal results of certain situations and 
certain conduct.  Where harm is to be anticipated, the 
problem of legal responsibility is raised.8 
 
 4. Santana v. Rainbow Cleaners, Inc., 969 A.2d 653, 658 (R.I. 2009); 
Ferreira v. Strack, 636 A.2d 682, 686 (R.I. 1994). 
 5. See 882 F.3d at 13. 
 6. Id. at 3.  In interpreting state law, federal courts must first consider 
any decisions of the state’s highest court.  When there is no state case law 
directly on point, the federal court must predict what a state’s highest court 
would decide if it were to address the issue itself.  This is called an “Erie guess.”  
See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that 
“[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of 
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state”). 
 7. E. L. Kellett, Private Person’s Duty and Liability for Failure to Protect 
Another Against Criminal Attack by Third Person, 10 A.L.R.3d 619, § 11 (“One 
of the most difficult considerations in cases dealing with the subject covered in 
this note is the problem of foreseeability.”). 
 8. Fowler Vincent Harper, The Foreseeability Factor in the Law of Tort, 7 
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Despite this seemingly inclusive definition, foreseeability can only 
be established in a negligence action in a limited number of ways.9 
The recognition of a sequence of events theory to prove 
foreseeability eliminates a dangerous loophole under previous 
Rhode Island case law that allowed landowners to easily argue a 
lack of foreseeability when there had been no prior criminal 
activity.  Whether harm resulting from a third party’s criminal act 
was foreseeable has rested heavily upon the existence of prior 
criminal acts.  Accordingly, absent skilled lawyering, business 
entity defendants were almost always relieved from liability for the 
first plaintiff’s injury as a result of their breach of duty to prevent 
criminal acts of others.10  This means that two identical plaintiffs 
who were harmed on the premises of the same business by two 
identical acts of the same third party, but at separate times, could 
obtain two different results for their negligence claims under Rhode 
Island law.  The first injured plaintiff would be unable to establish 
foreseeability, while the second injured plaintiff would be able to 
show the existence of prior similar criminal acts to establish 
foreseeability.  The second plaintiff would be able to put forth 
evidence that triggered a legal duty.  The first plaintiff injured is in 
essence a sacrificial lamb, creating an evidentiary foundation for 
future injured parties to assert foreseeability through prior similar 
criminal activity.11 
Part I of this Comment will explain the background and 
evolution of Rhode Island law on establishing foreseeability and a 
legal duty.  Part II will explain the holding in Mu and the 
implications of the adoption of a sequence of events theory.  Finally, 
Part III will argue that while the court in Mu held that the sequence 
of events that occurred established foreseeability, and thus a duty 
on a hotel corporation, the holding in Mu has broader applicability 
to business entities beyond hotels and innkeepers. 
I. RHODE ISLAND LAW ON ESTABLISHING FORESEEABILITY AND A 
 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 468, 468 (1932). 
 9. See id. 
 10. See generally Mu, 882 F.3d at 1. 
 11. See Woods-Leber v. Hyatt Hotels of P.R., Inc., 124 F.3d 47, 51 (1st Cir. 
1997) (finding it was not foreseeable that plaintiff would be attacked by a 
mongoose on defendant hotel’s property when no other patrons had ever been 
bitten before on the property). 
362 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 24:359 
DUTY 
“Rhode Island has not squarely addressed whether a business 
owner has a duty to protect its patrons from third-party criminal 
activity occurring on its premises.”12  Ordinarily in Rhode Island, 
no legal duty exists “to control a third party’s conduct to prevent 
harm to another individual.”13  However, the courts carved out an 
exception to this rule.  A defendant can have a legal duty to a 
plaintiff if the defendant has a “special relationship” with either the 
plaintiff or the third party whose conduct led to the harm.14 
A.  The Role of a Special Relationship in Conferring a Duty on 
Defendants 
A “special relationship” flows from a defendant’s status as a 
property owner.15  Examples of special relationships include: a 
common carrier and its passengers; an innkeeper and its guests; a 
possessor of land held open to the public and members of the public; 
and a legal or voluntary custodian and its ward.16  As the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts provides, “[a] special relationship . . 
. may arise between the possessor of land and those allowed on the 
land because of the possessor’s power of control over those allowed 
to enter.”17  
Similarly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has explained, a 
“possessor of land that holds the land open to the public/member of 
the public” is one type of special relationship that “giv[es] rise to a 
duty to aid or protect.”18  Given that holding land open to members 
 
 12. 1 JOHN ELLIOTT LEIGHTON, LITIGATING PREMISES SECURITY CASES § 2:4 
(Nov. 2018). 
 13. Santana, 969 A.2d at 658.  
 14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) 
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to 
prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless (a) a 
special relation exists between the actor and the third person which 
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct, or 
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which 
gives to the other a right to protection. 
Id. 
 15. See Martin v. Marciano, 871 A.2d 911, 915 (R.I. 2005); Volpe v. 
Gallagher, 821 A.2d 706 (R.I. 2003). 
 16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 17. See Volpe, 821 A.2d at 706 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 57, at 392 (5th ed.1984)). 
 18. Gushlaw v. Milner, 42 A.3d 1245, 1258 (R.I. 2012). 
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of the public is typically sufficient grounds for a special 
relationship, most businesses likely satisfy the requirements of a 
special relationship.19  As such, most businesses have a duty to aid 
and/or protect in Rhode Island.20 
B. Ad Hoc Approach to Finding a Duty 
In addition to a special relationship, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court has identified five other factors relevant to finding a duty.21  
While it is unclear if the existence of a special relationship is a 
precondition to examining the five factors, some courts have treated 
the finding of a special relationship as a precondition.22  Other 
courts have analyzed the five factors and stated that the 
relationship between the parties “is likewise considered” in its duty 
analysis.23 
Under Rhode Island case law, there is no “set formula for 
finding [a] legal duty,” and thus “such a determination must be 
made on a case-by-case basis.”24  The court employs an “ad hoc 
approach” to determining whether a particular duty exists.25  The 
five Banks factors considered in the ad hoc approach are: 
(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the degree 
of certainty that the plaintiff suffered an injury, (3) the 
closeness of connection between the defendant’s conduct 
and the injury suffered, (4) the policy of preventing future 
harm, and (5) the extent of the burden to the defendant 
and the consequences to the community for imposing a 
duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach.26 
Among the ad hoc factors relevant to this analysis, 
foreseeability is the “linchpin in determining the existence of any 
duty.”27  As the linchpin, it can be inferred that foreseeability is 
intentionally identified as the first factor analyzed.  Without 
 
 19. Habershaw v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 42 A.3d 1273, 1276 (R.I. 2012) 
(citing Terry v. Cent. Auto Radiators, Inc., 732 A.2d 713, 716 (R.I. 1999)). 
 20. See Gushlaw, 42 A.3d at 1257. 
 21. Mu v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 882 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2018). 
 22. Id. at 6 n.3. 
 23. Id.; Selwyn v. Ward, 879 A.2d 882, 887 (R.I. 2005). 
 24. Flynn v. Nickerson Cmty. Ctr., 177 A.3d 468, 477 (R.I. 2018) (citing 
Wells v. Smith, 102 A.3d 650, 653 (R.I. 2014)). 
 25. Mu, 882 F.3d at 6. 
 26. Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1225 (R.I. 1987). 
 27. Splendorio v. Bilray Demolition Co., 682 A.2d 461, 466 (R.I. 1996). 
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foreseeability, it is extremely difficult, even if the other factors were 
in their favor, for a plaintiff to establish the defendant had a duty 
to protect the plaintiff from harm caused by third parties in Rhode 
Island.  Not surprisingly, the issue of foreseeability is one of the 
most heavily litigated issues in negligence law.  Additionally, 
foreseeability is discussed more than any of the other five factors in 
most of the opinions issued by Rhode Island courts. 
In Rhode Island, “‘the specific kind of harm need not be 
foreseeable as long as it was foreseeable that there would be harm 
from the act which constituted the negligence, provided it was 
foreseeable that there would be violence toward others.’”28  An 
inquiry into a harm’s foreseeability considers whether “‘the 
category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result 
in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be 
imposed on the negligent party.’”29  For example, in Santana v. 
Rainbow Cleaners, the Rhode Island Supreme Court considered 
only whether the injury to a third party was foreseeable by the 
defendant’s failure to commit a third party to a mental hospital, not 
the specific assault suffered by the plaintiff.30  Similarly, in 
Gushlaw v. Milner, the court considered whether a driver, by 
returning an intoxicated individual to his or her vehicle, would 
reasonably perceive the risk of injury to other drivers.31  The court 
did not explore the specific harm to the plaintiff.32 
C. Foreseeability Without Evidence of Past Similar Occurrences 
Though plaintiffs only have to establish that harm was 
foreseeable, rather than the specific type of harm that occurred, 
plaintiffs still face challenges in establishing foreseeability in 
negligence actions.  Defendants often argue that the lack of prior 
similar criminal acts renders a plaintiff’s injury unforeseeable.33  
Historically, the inability to produce evidence of past similar 
criminal activity has served as the death knell to a plaintiff’s 
 
 28. Martin v. Marciano, 871 A.2d 911, 917 (R.I. 2005) (quoting Pollard v. 
Powers, 738 N.E.2d 1144, 1146 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000)). 
 29. Id. (quoting Banks, 522 A.2d at 1226–27). 
 30. 969 A.2d 653, 664 (R.I. 2009). 
 31. 42 A.3d 1245, 1261 (R.I. 2012). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Mu v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 882 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2018); see 
also Volpe v. Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699, 716 (R.I. 2003). 
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foreseeability argument.34  This is illustrated in Thanadabouth v. 
Kongmany, in which tenants were injured when a robber shot the 
plaintiffs and they sued the landlord for failure to maintain 
adequate security measures.35  The Rhode Island Supreme Court, 
in deciding this case, held that a landlord owed no duty to a tenant 
to prevent crimes by third persons when there was no evidence of 
criminal activity on the premises prior to the robbery and shooting 
at issue.36  The lack of prior criminal acts rendered the plaintiffs’ 
harm unforeseeable and prevented any legal duty from being 
created.37 
D. The Intersection of Foreseeability and Public Policy in the 
Analysis of a Duty 
Even when there is evidence of prior similar criminal activity, 
it may be insufficient to establish foreseeability.38  In certain 
circumstances, courts have found that important policy 
considerations warrant a deviation from past precedent.39  In Flynn 
v. Nickerson Community Center, the plaintiffs brought a negligence 
action against the Nickerson Community Center after a juvenile 
stole a van from the defendant’s premises and, while attempting to 
evade police, collided with the plaintiffs’ vehicle and caused serious 
injury.40  Even though the plaintiffs were able to put forth evidence 
that, on at least one occasion, a vehicle owned by another individual 
was stolen from the defendant’s premises, the court declined to 
recognize a duty.41 
In addition to the specific incident of past crime at Nickerson, 
the plaintiffs argued that, because the Nickerson Community 
Center is located in a high-crime area, the theft of a vehicle and 
subsequent accident was foreseeable harm.42  Notwithstanding the 
prior vehicle theft, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that the 
location of a defendant’s property in a high-crime area was not a 
 
 34. See Thanadabouth v. Kongmany, 712 A.2d 879 (R.I. 1998); see also 
Volpe, 821 A.2d at 699. 
 35. Thanadabouth, 712 A.2d at 879. 
 36. Id. at 880. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See, e.g., Flynn v. Nickerson Cmty. Ctr., 177 A.3d 468 (R.I. 2018). 
 39. See generally id. 
 40. Id. at 471. 
 41. Id. at 472 n.3. 
 42. Id. at 480. 
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relevant factor in establishing foreseeability.43  The court reasoned 
that there were important policy considerations against allowing 
proximity to a crime-ridden area to be a factor in a duty analysis.44  
Thus, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that Nickerson’s 
location in a high-crime area was a basis for foreseeability.45 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has also been persuaded by 
policy considerations to benefit a plaintiff.  In Volpe v. Gallagher, 
the court rejected what it described as the “who knew” defense 
asserted by the defendants.46  The Rhode Island Supreme Court 
found that the defendants did owe a legal duty of care despite the 
absence of past violent behavior.47  The policy considerations were 
so strong that they motivated the court to depart from the prior 
similar occurrences theory.48 
In Volpe, a private landowner’s adult son lived in her basement 
for the entirety of his life.49  Even though he suffered from severe 
mental illness, his mother, the defendant, allowed him to store 
firearms and ammunition in her basement.50  One afternoon, the 
defendant’s son emerged from the basement and shot and killed his 
next-door neighbor.51  The son had never used his firearms before 
this incident.52  Making this holding even more remarkable is that 
it was unclear if the defendant’s son shot his neighbor on the 
defendant’s premises or the victim’s premises.53 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated, “we hold[] the 
absence of a violent past did not excuse defendant’s conduct in 
failing to exercise control over her property to prevent such a 
mentally ill person from using her house as an ordnance depot.”54  
Like Flynn, the court in Volpe stated that important policy 
considerations can impact the role of prior similar criminal activity 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 481.  The court stated that this could “have the undesired 
consequence of ‘the departure of businesses from urban core areas’” or if 
businesses remain, additional security measures could mean higher prices for 
the goods and services that customers need.  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 45. Id. at 480. 
 46. 821 A.2d 699, 710 (R.I. 2003). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 702. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 703. 
 52. Id. at 710 
 53. Id. at 703. 
 54. Id. at 710. 
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when establishing foreseeability.55  The Volpe court reasoned that: 
a property owner allows a person who she knows is 
suffering from a delusionary and paranoid mental illness 
to use her property for the storage and maintenance of 
firearms and ammunition—despite realizing that this 
person has a history of talking to himself and to imaginary 
others; of harboring paranoid suspicions about other 
people; of not taking medication for his mental problems; 
and of not improving after receiving medical treatment for 
his mental illness—then that property owner is taking a 
foreseeable risk that a third party in close proximity of that 
dangerous activity will be hurt or killed.56 
The court was not willing to sacrifice the duty owed to the plaintiff 
even though there was no evidence of past similar occurrences.57 
II. MU V. OMNI HOTEL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION 
With the previously stated evolution of foreseeability law in 
mind, the First Circuit, applying Rhode Island law, held for the first 
time that the sequence of events leading to an invitee’s injury made 
the plaintiff’s harm foreseeable and, therefore, conferred a legal 
duty on the defendant-hotel.58  The sequence of events theory 
provides plaintiffs with an additional method for establishing 
foreseeability.  Plaintiffs who are unable to establish foreseeability 
through prior similar criminal activity can still prevail under the 
sequence of events theory without having to argue for the 
application of the narrow public policy exception to impose a duty 
on the defendant.59 
A. Facts 
In Mu v. Omni Hotels Management Corp., the plaintiff, Mr. Mu, 
lived in a condominium complex located on the premises of the 
defendant-hotel.60  At 2:10 a.m. on a summer evening, the hotel 
received a complaint that “kids [were] smoking pot in the next 
 
 55. See generally id. at 699; Flynn v. Nickerson Cmty. Ctr., 177 A.3d 468, 
480 (R.I. 2018). 
 56. Volpe, 821 A.2d at 710. 
 57. Id. at 716. 
 58. Mu v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 882 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2018). 
 59. See Volpe, 821 A.2d at 721. 
 60. Mu, 882 F.3d at 3. 
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room” and being “very loud.”61  The hotel sent two hotel security 
guards to the room.62  When they arrived, the security guards found 
twenty individuals inside the room and the registered hotel guest 
was not among them.63  The security guards evicted the occupants 
and removed them from the hotel’s premises.64 
At this time, the hotel’s valet observed the same group of 
individuals leave the lobby and walk down the street.65  Shortly 
thereafter, the group reemerged near the hotel’s driveway with a 
case of beer.66  The valet observed the group “being rowdy” and 
engage in a fight on the sidewalk near the hotel.67  The valet did 
not request hotel security or call the police.68  After the fight ended, 
Mu came down to the hotel driveway to greet his girlfriend.69  
There, Mu observed the group coming in and out the hotel’s lobby.70  
Mu then saw the group trying to engage in a fight with a man.  After 
the man walked away from the hotel, the group continued to pursue 
him.71  Mu instructed the valet to go get help, as he feared the group 
was violent.72  The valet responded that it  was not his problem, 
and then left to park a car.73 
Scared for his own safety, Mu headed for the lobby.74  As soon 
as Mu entered the lobby, he warned the hotel concierge that the 
group was outside.75  The group then stormed in and Mu could hear 
them celebrating that they “just beat up some kid.”76  Mu requested 
that the concierge remove the group from the property and call the 
police.77  In response, the group of individuals began to punch, 
shove, and hit Mu.78  The assault culminated when two members 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 4. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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of the group held Mu down while a third member of the group threw 
a table at him.79 
Mu later filed a lawsuit alleging negligence against the hotel.  
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island 
concluded that the defendant did not have a duty to protect the 
plaintiff and dismissed the action.80  The District Court reasoned 
that Mu presented no evidence the third parties committed prior 
similar criminal activity towards the plaintiff before the attack or 
prior criminal activity at the hotel generally.81  Mu appealed the 
decision to First Circuit Court of Appeals. 
B. Special Relationship and Foreseeability Based on Sequence of 
Events Theory 
The parties in Mu conceded that the hotel and the plaintiff had 
a special relationship because the defendant-hotel was a “possessor 
of land that holds the land open to the public/member of the public,” 
and the plaintiff was a member of the public.82  Therefore, the 
relationship between Mu and the defendant-hotel lent support to 
Mu’s argument that a duty existed.  Next, the court analyzed the 
element of foreseeability, and turned to the first and most 
persuasive of the Banks factors to determine if a duty 
existed.83  The plaintiff did not produce any evidence of prior 
criminal activity on the hotel’s premises.84  As such, defendant-
hotel argued that the harm was not foreseeable and, therefore, the 
hotel had no duty.85  The First Circuit rejected this argument.86 
The court accepted Mu’s argument that his harm was 
foreseeable because “‘at least four of Omni’s agents were aware of 
the group’s violent and illegal conduct during the thirty-five minute 
period before the attack.’”87  The First Circuit, persuaded by case 
law from other jurisdictions that have adopted a sequence of events 
theory, believed that the Rhode Island Supreme Court would rule 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 5. 
 81. Id. at 7. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 6; Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1225 (R.I. 
1987). 
 84. Mu, 882 F.3d at 7. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the same way.88  The court explained that it was foreseeable that 
the plaintiff would be harmed as a result of the group’s criminal 
acts because the group was evicted by security for causing a 
disturbance; subsequently obtained beer; fought with each other; 
attacked a passerby; and were permitted to reenter the hotel 
lobby.89  The First Circuit stated that its decision was “compatible 
with Rhode Island law,” and recognized that Omni owed the 
plaintiff a duty.90 
III. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THEORY VERSUS THE PAST 
OCCURRENCES THEORY AND A HOTEL’S DUTY UNDER MU 
The sequence of events theory adopted by the court in Mu 
allows a plaintiff to establish that harm is foreseeable when the 
particular sequence of events leading up to the harm made the 
harm foreseeable to the defendant.91  The standard to establish 
foreseeability under a sequence of events theory seems to be 
objective, and does not require a plaintiff to prove his or her specific 
defendant foresaw harm.92  Rather, the Mu court explained harm 
is foreseeable if “[a]n observer of this sequence of events would not 
be shocked to discover” the harm the plaintiff suffered.93  As long 
as the four other ad hoc factors do not hedge against the finding of 
a duty, and the sequence of events is compelling, the plaintiff will 
likely be able to establish that the defendant owed a duty of care to 
prevent harm from the criminal acts of third parties.94 
The plaintiff in Mu conceded his case would have failed under 
a “past occurrences” theory, but urged the court to recognize a 
sequence of events theory.95  The hotel argued that Rhode Island 
should follow a past occurrences approach when establishing 
foreseeability.96  Under a past occurrences approach, there is no 
bright line rule as to how many, or what type of, past similar 
 
 88. Id. at 7–8 (relying on Cotterhill v. Bafile, 865, P.2d 120, 122 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1993); Gould v. Taco Bell, 722 P.2d 511, 513–14 (Kan. 1986); Mills v. 
White Castle Sys., Inc., 421 N.W.2d 631, 632 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). 
 89. Mu, 882 F.3d at 9. 
 90. Id. at 10. 
 91. See id. at 9–10. 
 92. See id. at 10. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. (citing Cotterhill, 865 P.2d at 122; Gould, 722 P.2d at 513–14; 
Mills, 421 N.W.2d at 632). 
 95. Id. at 9. 
 96. Id. 
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incidents is sufficient to establish foreseeability.97  In jurisdictions 
that reject an ad hoc approach to finding that harm was foreseeable, 
as many as five prior incidents of assault were needed to 
sufficiently state a cause of action for third-party premises liability 
where the event that injured the plaintiff was assault.98 
Under the sequence of events approach adopted in Mu, which 
looks more to the totality of the circumstances, evidence of past 
similar incidents can be used as a supplementary factor to be 
included in a foreseeability analysis.99  But as evidenced in Mu, a 
successful assertion of the sequence of events theory eliminates the 
need for past similar incidents to establish foreseeability.100  The 
Mu holding expands the tools available to plaintiffs who suffer 
injuries through the criminal acts of third parties, and bolsters 
their likely success in a negligence action with compelling facts.101 
In Rhode Island, hotels and innkeepers must now be sensitive 
to hints and indications of violent behavior committed by third 
parties on their premises.102  Hotels—like the Omni—in cases 
where harm is foreseeable, under the sequence of events theory, 
will have a duty to act reasonably to protect everyone on the 
premises from the criminal acts of third parties.103 
Hotels may exercise reasonable care by maintaining adequate 
security measures, such as a security guard or video 
surveillance.104  Hotels may be required to implement low-cost 
tactics, including restraining guests in the event that danger is 
 
 97. 26 ERIC G. YOUNG, CAUSES OF ACTION 2d § 57 (2004, updated Oct. 2014).  
Practice guides advise attorneys that  
it seems unlikely that even the most conservative jurisdictions would 
find that a large number of prior incidents of murder or rape, for 
example, would be required before holding a business owner or 
proprietor liable for such crimes on its premises.  However, the 
severity of the crime often results in less foreseeability on the part of 
the landholder. 
Id. (citing Lopez v. McDonald’s Corp., 238 Cal. Rptr. 436 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1987)). 
 98. Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 281 S.E.2d 36, 40 (N.C. 1981). 
 99. See Mu, 882 F.3d at 6–7. 
 100. See id. at 9–10. 
 101. See id. at 9. 
 102. See id. at 10. 
 103. See id. 
 104. Doug Donaldson, 12 Ways to Increase Hotel Security, LODGING MAG. 
(Nov. 12, 2013), https://lodgingmagazine.com/ways-to-increase-hotel-security/
2/ [https://perma.cc/4AG5-2VXE]. 
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foreseeable and calling the police.105  Factors to consider when 
determining the adequacy of security measures include industry 
standards, community crime rate, crime rate of similar business 
enterprises, the extent of criminal activity in the area, and the 
security concerns unique to that particular hotel.106 
A. The Site of the Negligence or the Site of the Injury 
Before Mu, Rhode Island courts had not squarely addressed 
whether a business owner or proprietor owes a duty to its patrons 
to protect against third-party criminal activity occurring on its 
premises.  As such, many defendants have relied upon the holding 
in Ferreira v. Strack.107  In Ferreira, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court held that a landholder did not owe the plaintiff a duty to 
protect against criminal acts committed by third parties 
on adjacent property.108  There, the plaintiff sued a church after 
she was struck by a car driven by an intoxicated driver as she was 
crossing a busy street following church services.109  The court 
focused extensively on the fact that the injury occurred in an area 
outside of the church’s control, so Ferreira provides little guidance 
in assessing a landholder’s duty to protect patrons on its own 
premises.110 
Clearly, the holding in Ferreira is limited to the site or location 
of the injury.111  The holding in Mu suggests that the time may be 
ripe for an argument to expand the limited holding in Ferreira, as 
Mu appears to look to the location of the negligence rather than the 
location of the injury.112  While the issue in Mu was limited to 
foreseeability and the existence of a legal duty, the expansive 
nature of the sequence of events approach has the power to shift the 
negligence analysis from a general premises liability action that is 
restricted to injuries occurring on the landowner’s property, to an 
action in negligence for a failure to prevent off-premises injury.113 
 
 105. 1 J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY & 
LITIGATION 2d § 3:50 (2003). 
 106. Id. (citing Ellis v. Luxbury Hotels, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 359 (Ind. 1999)). 
 107. 636 A.2d 682 (R.I. 1994). 
 108. Id. at 689. 
 109. Id. at 684. 
 110. Id. at 686–87. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Mu v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 882 F.3d 1, 7–8, 25 (1st Cir. 2018). 
 113. See Ferreira, 636 A.2d at 685 (stating that landowners are not liable 
for injuries caused by the criminal acts of third parties on adjacent property 
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Frequently, the sequence of events that led to the foreseeability 
of injury also reveals the defendant’s negligence.  For example, the 
sequence of events that led to the foreseeability of Mu’s injuries 
could also be illustrative of Omni’s inadequate security, poor staff 
training to handle incidents like rowdy guests and intruders, and 
lack of security protocol.114  The failure of Omni’s agent, the valet 
driver, to alert hotel security or the police indicates that guest 
safety was not a priority.115  Further, the hotel’s security cameras 
were not functioning, which rendered the security office unable to 
surveil the entrance and take preventative measures—such as 
sending personnel to protect hotel occupants, like Mu, when the 
third-party assailants returned.116  Even if Mu had been injured on 
property adjacent to the hotel, Mu could point to these failures in 
the standard of care, and possibly succeed under a non-premises 
negligence theory (provided he was able to establish the other 
elements required in a negligence action.)117 
Other jurisdictions have found a duty when the injury occurred 
off-premises.  Weighing the sequence of events (referred to in 
Colorado as the “totality of the circumstances”), the Colorado 
Supreme Court found that a hotel owed a duty beyond its property 
line when the hotel evicted intoxicated guests and forced them to 
leave its property, and one of the guests was then injured in a drunk 
driving accident.118  The hotel did not allow the guests to wait in 
the lobby for a cab and, despite knowledge of the group’s 
intoxication, sent the individuals away in their vehicle.119  Fifteen 
miles from the hotel, the intoxicated guests collided with another 
car.120  The court found that the injury was foreseeable under the 
sequence of events theory and, therefore, the hotel owed a duty to 
 
under a premises liability theory); see also Mu, 882 F.3d at 7, 10. 
 114. See generally Mu, 882 F.3d 1. 
 115. See id. at 4. 
 116. Id. at 4–5. 
 117. See Volpe v. Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699, 704 (R.I. 2003) (finding a duty 
existed even though it was not clear if the injury occurred on the defendant’s 
property or adjacent property not owned or maintained by the defendant); see 
also United States v. Stevens, 994 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 2008) (finding a scientific 
laboratory owed a legal duty to the general public to prevent third parties from 
stealing hazardous substances). 
 118. Westin Operator, LLC v. Groh, 347 P.3d 606, 608 (Colo. 2015).  It is 
important to note that this is not a dram shop case.  The defendant did not 
supply or sell alcohol to any of the guests. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
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the intoxicated guests.121  The court noted several alternatives that 
would have been more reasonable instead of evicting the guests and 
forcing them to their car, such as calling the police for assistance or 
calling a cab.122 
Hotels and innkeepers in jurisdictions like Colorado and Rhode 
Island can no longer assume that a lack of prior similar incidents 
will shield them from liability when injury is foreseeable.123  Hotels 
and innkeepers should also be aware that, as case law evolves 
around the country, they may be required to not only take steps to 
prevent injury on the premises, but also to prevent injury beyond 
the confines of their property.124 
B. Current Events and a Sequence of Events Leading to 
Foreseeability 
Current events, such as the shooting at the Harvest Music 
Festival in Las Vegas, the Parkland School in Florida, and the 
shooting that occurred at YouTube’s headquarters in California, 
reveal that threats to personal safety are progressing.125  A Federal 
Bureau of Investigation study found that nearly half of the 160 
active-shooting incidents that occurred in the past decade took 
place in commercial settings.126  When a person or group of 
individuals shows signs of excessive substance abuse or symptoms 
of mental illness that demonstrate a propensity for violence, like 
those that perpetrated many of the mass shootings, those charged 
with securing the safety of the premises must be on alert.  
Innkeepers, and other business entities that have a “special 
relationship” with those on their premises, are in the best position 
 
 121. Id. at 616. 
 122. Id. at 614. 
 123. Mu v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 882 F.3d 1, 9–10 (1st Cir. 2018). 
 124. Westin, 347 P.3d at 615–16. 
 125. See Enjoli Francis, Security Failures in Parkland School Shooting 
Included Unlocked Doors, No PA System, ABC NEWS (Dec. 29, 2018, 5:01 AM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/security-failures-parkland-school-shooting-
included-unlocked-doors/story?id=60056864 [https://perma.cc/3H2Z-R9ED]; 
see also Tiffany Hsu & Jack Nicas, Youtube Shooting Puts a Focus on 
Workplace Security, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
04/05/technology/corporate-security-active-shooter-youtube.html 
[https://perma.cc/8PXF-JM9B]; Rhana Natour, Are Hotels and Outdoor 
Concerts Any Safer Since the Las Vegas Attack?, PBS (May 7, 2018, 4:49 PM), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/are-hotels-and-outdoor-concerts-any-
safer-since-the-las-vegas-attack [https://perma.cc/35QN-FYCW]. 
 126. See infra section I.A. 
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to be alert and proactive about maintaining safety and security for 
guests.127  Encouraging businesses to disrupt threats of violence 
and implement proper security training and protocol to combat 
these threats is in the best interest of the business entity and every 
individual that enters the premises.  This is particularly true in the 
age of increased violence and mass shootings.128 
In addition to putting forth general knowledge about the 
correlation between intoxication, mental illness, and violence 
through expert testimony and scientific journals that have 
documented the connection, plaintiffs can also elicit experiential 
observations by hospitality staff members in the vicinity about the 
link between substance abuse and violence.129  Plaintiffs looking to 
focus  on the foreseeability of the specific type of harm suffered may 
look to evidence showing the rate of violent incidences among 
intoxicated drinkers, the types of intoxicated drinkers who become 
violent, or the class of persons at risk of violent harm from a visibly 
intoxicated person.130  Similar data may be utilized to show the 
correlation between mental illness and violence. 
Recognizing foreseeability through the use of a sequence of 
events will incentivize businesses to employ best safety practices 
(in an effort to avoid litigation) that, in turn, keep the community 
safer.  With mental health awareness on the rise, access to 
information regarding how to identify symptoms of substance abuse 
and mental illness, and how to respond to those symptoms, is easier 
than ever to obtain.131  This is important because mental illness 
and substance abuse are two potential indicators of violence.132  As 
with the young and rowdy crowd in Mu, many of the perpetrators 
of crime, who become the subject of personal injury cases, show 
signs of aggression or indications that they will cause violence 
 
 127. See infra section I.A. 
 128. See, e.g., Press Release, ASIS Int’l and Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt., 
ASIS International and SHRM Release American National Standard on 
Workplace Violence Prevention and Intervention (Oct. 20, 2011), 
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 129. See Piazza v. Kellim, 377 P.3d 492, 503 (Or. 2016). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See, e.g., Mental Health First Aid, NAT’L COUNCIL FOR BEHAV. HEALTH, 
https://www.thenationalcouncil.org/about/mental-health-first-aid/ 
[https://perma.cc/A23S-5ZYY] (last visited Feb. 27, 2019). 
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before they commit any acts of violence.133  Business entities—
especially hotels—should be ready to fulfill their duty to act 
reasonably to protect guests from the criminal acts of third parties 
when behavioral patterns indicate a propensity for crime or 
violence. 
In many cases, the burden on a hotel will be little more than 
common-sense preventative measures, such as calling local 
police.134  A study comparing averted acts of violence to those that 
actually occurred highlighted that simple measures, such as 
reporting threats of violence as soon as they appear and 
implementing employee safety training, were differentiators in 
averting violence.135  Requiring businesses to develop a more keen 
and attentive sensitivity to events as they unfold should mitigate 
injuries committed by third parties and would keep negligence law 
contemporary with the ever-evolving world. 
C. Hotels, Innkeepers, and Beyond 
Though not yet formally adopted by the state courts in Rhode 
Island, the Mu case, combined with case law from other states, will 
arguably have broad applicability on all business-entity 
defendants.136  The holding in Mu was specific to a hotel defendant, 
but a majority of businesses invite members of the public onto their 
premises and will now likely have a duty to prevent invitees from 
the foreseeable criminal acts of third parties in Rhode Island.137 
Courts in other states have adopted a sequence of events theory 
to establish foreseeability that a third party would commit crime on 
a business entity’s property.138  The foreseeability of a third party’s 
 
 133. See generally Doe v. St. Michael’s Med. Ctr., 445 A.2d 40 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1982); Jeanne Sahadi, How Common Is Workplace Violence?, 
CNN MONEY, https://money.cnn.com/2015/08/26/news/workplace-violence-
virginia-shooting [https://perma.cc/U64L-VGEY] (last visited Feb. 24, 2019). 
 134. See Shayna Balch, Workplace Violence: 5 Ways to Keep Your Employees 
Safe, PHX. BUS. J., https://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/blog/
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(last visited Feb. 24, 2019). 
 135. Dean Esserman, The School Shootings that Don’t Happen, NAT’L 
POLICE FOUND., https://www.policefoundation.org/the-school-shootings-that-
dont-happen/ [https://perma.cc/Y6K8-WJ32] (last visited Feb. 24, 2019). 
 136. See generally Mu v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 882 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2018). 
 137. See generally id. 
 138. See Gould v. Taco Bell, 722 P.2d 511 (Kan. 1986); Cotterhill v. Bafile, 
865 P.2d 120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Mills v. White Castle Sys. Inc., 421 N.W.2d 
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crime(s) against another has led to the finding of a duty for 
restaurants and tavern owners.139  In these cases, the third parties 
responsible for the plaintiffs’ injuries exhibited signs of violence and 
the business-entity defendant’s agents neglected to partake in 
simple and reasonable action to protect patrons.140 
1. Innkeepers, Tavern Owners, and Restaurants 
State courts in Kansas have long recognized that 
“A proprietor of an inn, hotel, restaurant, or similar 
establishment is liable for an assault upon a guest or 
patron by another guest, patron, or third person where he 
has reason to anticipate such assault, and fails to exercise 
reasonable care under the circumstances to prevent the 
assault or interfere with its execution.”141 
In Gould v. Taco Bell, the plaintiff was verbally assaulted by 
another patron of the restaurant as the manager watched.142  The 
patron then physically attacked the plaintiff inside the restaurant, 
and again in the parking lot.143  The manager failed to respond to 
pleas to call the police while the plaintiff was inside the restaurant, 
and only contacted police after the violence spilled into the parking 
lot.144  The Supreme Court of Kansas found the sequence of conduct 
by the patron, observed by the manager, made the plaintiff’s harm 
foreseeable.145  The plaintiff was awarded punitive damages in an 
effort to “to punish the [restaurant] for malicious, vindictive or 
willful and wanton invasion of the injured party’s rights” by failing 
to intervene or warn the plaintiff of the danger posed by the third 
party.146 
Tavern owners have also been found liable for the foreseeable 
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criminal acts of third parties.147  In Cotterhill v. Bafile, the Arizona 
Court of Appeals overturned the trial court’s judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the defendant and ordered 
a new trial to determine the defendant’s liability for an assault that 
occurred at the bar he owned.148  The court emphasized that “bad 
feelings” between the plaintiff and the third parties “persisted for 
10 to 15 minutes, including loud and hostile verbal exchanges 
among several men,” and despite this, the bartender “did not 
attempt to calm the situation, ask anyone to leave, threaten to call 
the police[,] or call the police during that time.”149  The court found 
that the sequence of events, that albeit unfolded over only ten to 
fifteen minutes, could lead a reasonable jury to find the fight was 
foreseeable and therefore convey a duty upon the tavern owner.150 
2. Other Entities 
While restaurants and taverns may logically go with hotels and 
innkeepers, courts have also recognized a sequence of events theory 
to establish the foreseeability of criminal acts to create a duty 
between a school district and the victim of a criminal act committed 
by a student of the district.151  In N.L. v. Bethel School District,  a 
high school student of the school district raped another student of 
the school when the student convinced the victim to skip track 
practice under the guise of getting lunch.152  The student who raped 
the younger victim was a convicted sex offender, and the school’s 
principal had been informed of the student’s status.153  In addition 
to being a registered sex offender, the student had been a source on 
ongoing disruptions and had committed various serious 
disciplinary infractions at the school leading up to the rape.154  
Despite these alarming facts, the principal failed to notify other 
school employees of the student’s status as a registered sex offender 
or implement a safety plan to protect other students.155  
Furthermore, the student was permitted to act as a student-mentor 
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for younger students on the track team.156  The court found that 
the sequence of events leading up to the victim’s rape made her 
harm foreseeable and the inaction of the school district, the 
principal, and other agents of the district amounted to a breach of 
the duty of care owed to the victim.157 
The recognition of a sequence of events to establish 
foreseeability can have impact on all defendants found to have a 
special relationship with a defendant, even those that are less 
obvious such as schools. 
CONCLUSION 
The recognition of a sequence of events theory to establish the 
foreseeability of a plaintiff’s harm is a necessary expansion of 
current negligence law in Rhode Island because it permits a court 
to consider the totality of the circumstances when contemplating 
foreseeability, and eliminates the ability of a culpable defendant to 
evade liability when the plaintiff is unable to produce evidence of 
prior criminal acts or strong policy considerations.  Further, it 
raises the bar for businesses to be aware of, and reactive towards, 
threats of criminal activity on their property.  While the holding in 
Mu was narrow and addressed only the duty owed by a hotel, the 
reasoning applied by the First Circuit has the potential for broad 
applicability encompassing all business (and quasi-business) 
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